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This article examines the use of Complexity Theory as an
inspiration for the creation of new musical works, and
highlights problems and possible solutions associated with its
application as a compositional tool. In particular it explores
how the philosophy behind Complexity Theory affects notions
of process-based composition, indeterminacy in music and the
performer/listener/environment relationship, culminating in
providing a basis for the understanding of music creation as
an active process within a context. The author presents one of
his own sound installations, Cross-Pollination, as an example
of a composition inspired and best understood from the
philosophical position as described in Complexity Theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
In Umberto Eco’s 1959 article ‘The Open Work’ (Eco
1989), he discusses the link between the con-
temporary scientific views of the day and the struc-
turing of artistic forms. He contrasts the scientific
view of the medieval world, with its fixed hierarchy of
preordained orders and closed single conception of
reality, with the world as described by Einstein’s
science – in which time and space are co-dependent,
and multiple instances of reality collapse upon view-
ing. As Eco notes, such a change in worldview is
evident through a comparison of the music of each
age, a contrast evident in a comparison between
medieval plainsong and the indeterminate composi-
tions of John Cage and Stockhausen. Since Eco’s
article in the late 1950s there has been a rise in a new
kind of scientific thinking, that of Complexity Theory.
This article seeks to address how this new form of
thinking about the world has permeated musical
thinking of today, acting as inspiration for the
structuring of new music. This article thus begins by
sketching out the main concepts behind Complexity
Theory, concentrating on the philosophy inspired by
this science and a notion of emergence as relevant to
an observer. It outlines some common problems
associated with the application of Complexity Theory
as a compositional tool and goes on to examine
notions of process in experimental music from this
perspective. It contrasts top-down and bottom-up
approaches to composition, looking at the employ-
ment of environmental context as a tool for inde-
terminacy. The article finishes by presenting the
author’s interactive sound installation Cross-Pollination
as an example of a composition that embodies this
philosophy.
2. COMPLEXITY THEORY
Complexity Theory is a branch of science that con-
siders the complicated many-bodied systems that lie
on the edge of chaos; systems that exist between the
predictability of classical science, as exemplified by
Newton’s linear mechanics and the mathematical
instability of Chaos Theory. With its roots in the
systems theory of the 1960s and links to Cybernetics
and Artificial Intelligence, Complexity Theory
describes the special behaviour of many-bodied sys-
tems to spontaneously self-organise into higher-level
structures. The defining characteristic of these self-
organising properties is that they are not imposed
externally but rather emerge as an internal property
of the system. One example that is described by
Steven Johnson in his book emergence (Johnson
2002) is that of the organisation of an ant colony. In
the chapter The Myth of the Ant Queen, Johnson
describes how the ants make collective group deci-
sions such as where to bury their dead, where to
forage for food and how many ants should be on
guard duty, through individual ant-to-ant (chemical)
interaction. In this way, rather than solving problems
with a hierarchical command system, decisions
emerge through low-level interaction between group
members. The group intelligence of the colony is
greater than the sum of intelligence of the individual
ants and can be considered an emergent property of
the interactions between them. Such emergent struc-
tures are a feature of all complex systems and are
formed within the system through interactions
between the systems components. They can be con-
sidered as new and novel structures, not immediately
obvious from a examination of the system in a pre-
emergent state. Such systems are resistant to reduc-
tive analysis, in that a reductive view of them cannot
account for the emergence of structure as it considers
the ‘entirety as the sum of the single parts it is com-
posed of’ (Bertuglia and Vaio 2005: 273). Thus it is
impossible to experience this organisation just by
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considering each single element in turn; rather, one
needs to take a holistic view of the system and con-
sider it in its entirety. Such a view of reality presents
a very different view of the world to that which is
described by the linearity of classical mechanics. For
example, Laplace stated it would be possible to
determine the state of the whole universe by con-
sidering each entity as a separate entity; that as long
as we had enough knowledge about a system we
would be able to predict the outcomes of the system.
In contrast to this, in complex systems exhibiting
emergence we have states spontaneously self-organis-
ing into other structures. The causal powers affecting
these states are not external hierarchical powers but
rather are an exploration of internal stable states,
reductive top-down analysis of the emergent properties
does not yield results; rather, we have to take a ‘bot-
tom up’ approach to understanding such systems.
In Complexity Theory it is held that emergent
structures are new and novel structures that appear
through interaction; however, just how new and
novel these structures have to be to be classed as
emergent has long been the subject of philosophical
scrutiny. A presentation of the full philosophical
discussion is outside the scope of this article; how-
ever, it is widely held that these many distinctions
fall broadly into two fundamentally distinguishable
concepts, those of epistemological and ontological
emergence (O’Connor and Wong 2006). These two
formations of the concept of emergence are deli-
neated by the strength of the definition of the meta-
physical and ontological status of the emergent
properties themselves. Ontological emergence con-
cerns itself with the formation of fundamentally new
emergent properties, for example ontological emer-
gentists argue that human consciousness can be
described as an emergent property of the brain. In
contrast to this, epistemological emergence relies on
the notion of emergent states not being predictable
from their pre-emergent structures. This notion
of predictability is an interesting one as it implies
the presence of an agent that is doing the prediction.
The ability to predict emergent states changes from
person to person and so relies on a personal subjective
view of emergence. Thus, such definitions of episte-
mological emergence can be argued to be observer
dependent. Emergence in this construction can be
termed ‘emergence relative to an observer’. As such
predictive emergent states do not require any funda-
mentally new structures to appear, defining a system as
emergent in this context relies on new structures form-
ing in the perceptual systems of an observer. New and
novel states emerge through a user’s changing percep-
tion of the system, and the level of complexity they
experience is related to their complexity as a person.
This subjective construction of the world suggested
by Complexity Theory can also be contrasted with
that of classical science. Classical science relies on a
world ready to be sampled by an objective observer,
a world that can be separated into its component parts
that then can be modelled and predicted from an
objective, rational viewpoint. Complex systems, how-
ever, cannot be separated in this way; rather, they are
constructed through the interactions of their many
constituents. They interact with their context to form
and re-form, to co-evolve with their environment. A
recognition that complex systems do not exist in iso-
lation, but rather are defined in conjunction with other
complex systems, highlights the interconnectivity and
interdependence of all elements in the creation of
reality. Complex systems suggest there is no objective
standpoint from outside the system from which to
view reality. They thus outline a more complicated
relationship with an observer, challenging ideas of
subjectivity and addressing issues of how, and why we
interact with the world.
3. MUSICAL PROCESSES
Complex systems present a number of exciting avenues
to explore from an artistic perspective, not least the
promise of the ability to outperform the designer, to
create new and novel structures that cannot be pre-
dicted by the elements of their construction. However,
they also throw up a number of challenges to the artist.
As emergent properties are by their very definition un-
predictable in nature, the processes needed to generate
complex behaviour are hard to determine. To negate
this problem, composers working in this scenario
often employ processes known to produce complex
results, for example flocking or swarm algorithms.
Such processes, however, are extra-musical, often being
drawn from Artificial Intelligence, or engineering-
based research. There is no guarantee that such algo-
rithms applied to music are going to make musical or
aesthetic sense. Also, if, as I have argued, these emer-
gent structures are observer dependent and arise in the
perceptual faculties of an observer, careful thought has
to be given to link between these emergent properties
and sound. In fact, I argue that there needs to be a
musical connection between the emergent structures
that are produced by these processes and their rendi-
tion in sound. This relationship between the process
used to create the music and the music itself is worth
further examination.
I see this concern for an employment of perceptible
process to be similar to the concerns evidenced by
a consideration of Steve Reich’s compositional
method. Reich in his article Music as a Gradual
Process (Reich 2004) stated that he was interested in
processes that can be heard happening throughout
the sounding music. For Reich it is important that the
process itself is evident whilst listening to the music;
in other words, it is something that is perceptible to
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the listeners. He contrasts his own employment of
process with that of composers in the serial tradition,
whom he accuses of having no audible connection
between process and content. For example, Hamman
writing about Iannis Xenakis’ 1957 piece Archorripsis,
in which the music is composed via a mapping process
of four different probability distributions to musical
characteristics (time, space, timbre and glissando
speed), states that the material arises from an ‘intrusion
of technique’ (Hamman 2004: 121). In this conception
of music creation musical form is constructed from a
position extraneous to music, the sonification of para-
meters generated by external code. It is an under-
standing of music construction that is akin to an
objective top-down perspective, a position outside of
the music in which to make rational decisions deli-
neated by cold scientific code.
In contrast to this, I think Reich is striving for an
employment of process that can be heard directly as
artefacts in the music; processes which themselves have
an audio element, that require no mapping between
algorithm and sound. Reich states ‘[w]hat I am inter-
ested in is a compositional process and a sounding
music that are one and the same thing’ (Reich 2004:
305). It is best perhaps to take an example of Reich’s
own music to explain what he means by this. Let us
consider Reich’s piece Pendulum Music (1968), which
he himself describes as his ‘ultimate process piece’
(Reich 2007). In this well-known piece, 2, 3, 4 or more
microphones are suspended over loudspeakers. These
microphones are all pulled back and released together
such that they generate feedback whilst swinging over
the loudspeakers. The forthcoming structure of the
sound is formed by the change in phase of the oscilla-
tions of the microphones. In this piece there is a direct
correlation between the physical process and the gen-
eration of sound; the music is literally formed by the
process. It is the process. The music and the process are
both inherently physical acoustical processes articulated
in sound, such that the structure and the surface of the
piece are inseparable. If we employ Hamman’s defini-
tion of technique as a notion most commonly under-
stood as a ‘means – conceptual or technical – by which
things get produced’ (Hamman 2002: 2), we can see in
this instance that the distinction between the technique
used to produce the ‘things’ and the ‘things’ themselves
have collapsed, such that there is now no distinction
between technique and product. There is no distance
between the technique (the process) used to create the
music and the music itself. Such a collapse between
process and product allows for an examination of the
product in which the process itself can become the
object of investigation. Allowing the listener direct
access to the process of music creation provides an
insight into how the algorithm functions in the gen-
eration of sound and hopefully, by extension, an
appreciation of the complexity of the work.
I think it is worth making a distinction between what
I see as two different approaches to process-based
composition: top-down and bottom-up approaches. I
see top-down approaches to process-based composi-
tion as an imposition of structural or timbral decisions
from extraneous means: the application of externally
based code; abstracted, algorithmic procedures form-
ing the basis of the music. In contrast, in bottom-up
approaches there is a tighter link between the process
and the musical product. There is no mapping of data
to music or the sonification of a pre-existing algo-
rithmic process; rather, the process itself is a musical
one. This tighter link has the effect of letting the lis-
tener hear the process as a musical process and creates
a situation that is conducive to them perceiving the
emergent structures through sound. I am not saying
that process-based music is the only music in which
structures form in the perceptual processes through
listening; instead, that music such as Reich’s is a lim-
iting case of such an exploration of process. In a sce-
nario in which we are looking to make people aware
that they are in the moment of perception, pieces that
are pared down to this and this only, that have a dis-
cernible connection between the process we are trying
to convey and the sound we are hearing, have a better
chance of success.
4. INDETERMINATE PROCESSES
The second of the problems facing composers work-
ing with structures from Complexity Theory is that of
designing a system that should surprise the designer.
Taking the examples of Reich’s and Xenakis’ music
mentioned earlier, one could argue that there is a lack
of true novelty or progression within these forms of
process-based music. What then would add some true
indeterminacy to the work? What would give rise to
multiple instances of reality, the novelty and surprise
of the emergent structures found in Complexity
Theory?
In Eco’s article ‘The Open Work’ in which he
introduces the concept of the same name, he describes
open works as ‘works which are brought to their
conclusion by the performer at the same time as he
experiences them on an aesthetic plane’ (Eco 1989:
169); that is, in the act of performance. Eco employs
Stockhausen’s Klavierstuck XI as an example of such
a work. This composition asks the performer to
choose, from a single large sheet of paper of note
groupings, which groupings to play in which order.
The instrumentalist’s freedom is in the construction
of the structure of the piece. Eco likens it to working
with the ‘components of a construction kit’ (Eco
1989: 169). He reminds us that this definition of ‘open
works’ is not to be confused with the term openness
as used by the aesthetic theorists, in which a work is
open ‘on account of its susceptibility to countless
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different interpretations which do not impinge on its
unadulterable specificity’ (Eco 1989: 169). Eco thus
makes the distinction between works open in a per-
formative sense, and those that could be considered
only open in an interpretive sense. Eco draws paral-
lels between this performatively open work and the
physics of Einstein. He links the lack of a linear
causal system in complex behaviours with a similar
‘general breakdown of causation’ in composition,
with the composer bequeathing previously composi-
tional decisions, to the performer or to chance. Eco
also posits a link between ‘multivalue logics’ in which
several views of reality can be said to be true at once,
(for example the wave-particle duality of light) and
the poetics of the open work: the freedom of the
performer and the ‘discontinuity’ of contemporary
physics.
For John Cage, however, Klavierstuck XI is not
indeterminate enough. He challenges the idea that this
piece is indeed indeterminate with respect to its per-
formance. Cage believes that as the piece contains the
twelve tones of an octave and a regularity of beat
(within a contemporary definition), the performer will
be lead to give the piece all the conventional aspects of
European music (Cage 1958: 178). Cage goes as far as
to say ‘[i]n the case of Klavierstuck XI the use of
indeterminacy is in this sense unnecessary since it is
ineffective. The work might as well have been written
in all aspects determinately’ (Cage 1958: 178).
For Cage, the purpose of indeterminacy is to bring
about an unforeseen situation; to give the composer
and performer freedom to create ‘experimental music’,
music where the outcome is not foreseen or pre-
dictable, and ‘[t]o remove the work from the body of
European musical conventions’. Cage is not looking
for a way of making music that is ambiguous in its
interpretation, but is employing indeterminacy as a
way of implementing a ‘specificity of listening’
(LaBelle 2006: 9). Cage is seeking a movement towards
an extra-musical situation, away from music, towards
sound, ‘from the symbolic and representational
(music) to the phenomenal and non-representational
(noise)’ (LaBelle 2006: 9). Cage’s concept of the inde-
terminate work does not expect us to relate to a sound
in any one way, but places sound in a context, which
allows us to relate to it in an increasingly personal
way. As LaBelle notes Cage is moving away from an
overtly musical framework for composition to a more
contextual framework that relates the performance
and the performers to their cultural and environmental
context.
Eco draws a link between these indeterminate
forms of composition and Pousseur’s ‘field of possi-
bilities’, describing the notion of a field as a ‘complex
interplay of motive forces’, ‘a configuration of pos-
sible events’ and of ‘possibility’ as ‘the discarding of
a static, syllogistic view of order, a corresponding
devolution of intellectual authority to personal deci-
sion, choice and social context’ (Eco 1989: 170), thus
challenging the hierarchical external power of the
composer and instead suggesting an approach to
composition in which the composer sets up a situa-
tion within which it is possible to interact and form is
constructed indeterminately through low-level inter-
action. Such an open consideration of composition
has direct parallels with Complexity Theory but
also the contextually and philosophically similar
standpoint of ‘art is life’, with its implied reference to
Happenings, Fluxists and the Environmentalists. Such
movements had a common philosophy in seeking
to include the environment and everyday objects in
their art-based events, the opening up of boundaries
between the performers and audiences and the recog-
nition of natural environmental spaces as places for
artistic exchange of complex creative potential. These
artistic practices can be characterised by their perfor-
mances, where form emerges through the interaction of
many disparate elements, where form is not imposed
from the top, but emerges through interactions amongst
the constituents. The coming together of people and
events in this manner is the meeting of a complex
system of interactions with other complex systems:
the interaction of the complexity of reality with the
complexity of the human.
I suggest that this recognition of the importance of
space, place and situation in composition can be
employed as a strategy for escaping from generatively
closed compositions. The creation of works that are
open to environmental interaction, that embrace and
utilise their context, is a way of injecting some inde-
terminacy back into the system. In this way the sys-
tem is open to interaction and thus can be considered
as just one part of a complex ecology of music-
making.
5. ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES
Jack Burnham, speaking in the context of system-
based art, makes the assertion that ‘[t]he specific
function of modern didactic art has been to show that
art does not reside in material entities, but in relations
between people and the components and their
environments’ (Burnham 1968: 32). Thus, if we con-
sider the art created in environments as part of the
ecosystem that includes the environment, perhaps we
can create systems that exhibit a conceptual richness
in what they convey and they way in which they are
perceived. This approach to art would be in contrast
to Walter Benjamin’s ‘aura’ of the object and its
associated authority (Benjamin 1936), but more in
common with Agnostino di Scipio’s idea that ‘sonic
art is a tension towards a limit – that is, it is about
the merging of the qualitative and the quantitative, in
an inextricable exchange between the primacy of
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perception and the primacy of modern reason’ (di
Scipio 2002: 23).
Bernard notes the tendency of Minimalist art for
the content not to reside in the art object itself, but
rather ‘in its physical setting or in viewer’s responses’
(Baker 1988, quoted in Bernard 1993: 117). In this
scenario the real-time experiences of the viewer
become important; the art object becomes something
temporal in nature, something that evolves over time.
This seems to be a relevant stance for process-
based music, where the art object and technique are
one and the same, interdependent in form and func-
tion. In di Scipio’s words there is a ‘healthy confusion
between matter and form as a radical stance con-
cerning the indissoluble intertwining of nature and
culture, object and subject’ (di Scipio 2002: 23). Di
Scipio likens this indissoluble intertwining with
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, the fact that
knowing information about one aspect of a particle
affects how much information we can know about
another. He presents this as an example of the pro-
blems of dealing with anything in a truly objective
manner, and speculates that in fact ‘[t]o deal with
something is to transform it, so the essence of ‘it’ is a
matter of speculation’ (di Scipio 2002: 23).
Burnham discusses the same things:
The computer’s most profound aesthetic implication is
that we are being forced to dismiss the classical view of
art and reality which insists that man stand outside of
reality in order to observe it, and, in art, requires the
presence of the picture frame and the sculpture pedestal.
The notion that art can be separated from its everyday
environment is a cultural fixation [in other words, a
mythic structure] as is the ideal of objectivity in science.
It may be that the computer will negate the need for such
an illusion by fusing both observer and observed, ‘inside’
and ‘outside.’ It has already been observed that the
everyday world is rapidly assuming identity with the
condition of art. (Burnham 1969: 119)
The above assertion rings true with Cage’s view that
all sound is music and that there is a blurring of the
distinction between art and life. For example, Cage’s
403300, 1952, arguably his ultimate indeterminate piece,
is also about the music of everyday sounds. In fact
there is no distinction between the two.
In his essay, Happenings in the New York Scene
(Kaprow and Kelley 2003), Kaprow describes the
many disparate elements of what could construct a
‘Happening’. The list includes dragging of ice and
stones, blue lights flashing, nude women throwing
spinach, muslin telephone booths, projected slides
and movies, wine jugs, record players, microphones,
iron barrels, ropes, breathing sounds on speakers,
lawn mowers, and more (Kaprow and Kelley 2003:
15). The materials of the happenings were always
different, but their structure had a common ethos.
Their form was open ended and fluid. They employed
chance in their construction and there was a break-
down in boundaries between audience and perfor-
mers. Kaprow states that even if you entered the
space only intending to fulfil the role of a spectator
you often found yourself caught up in the creation of
art after all (Kaprow and Kelley 2003: 15).
Such ecological approaches to composition and an
understanding of compositional process from such a
perspective seem to have the most elements akin to
complex theories. These approaches explore issues of
site-specificity, liveness and audience interaction in their
work and take into account the active and situational
notion of encounter that is manifest specifically in
sonically led environments. As Owen Green (2006: 5)
points out, in di Scipio’s work there is a ‘structural
coupling of humans, technology and their environment.
The environment is not something we control, but
interact with, and it exerts reciprocal effects on us;
technology is not a means to exercise control, but again
something we interact with that affects the course of
our actions.’ This lack of attempt to control the envir-
onment has a lot in common with the ‘open composi-
tion’ methods employed by Cage. The environment and
the structure in the environment have been carefully
crafted by the artist, but the mode of interaction within
this crafted situation is left open and not prescribed.
Such a conception of music sits well with Simon
Waters’ discussion of the notion of a ‘performance
ecosystem’, a conception of music performance that
does not rely on a performer/instrument distinction
but rather highlights the ‘ambiguity [and] fragility of
the performer instrument articulation’ (Waters 2007).
In this notion there is a mutability between environ-
ment and viewer, environment and installation,
installation and viewer, such that the environment
and the viewer can be understood as becoming part
of the generative process themselves, each as closely
linked to the evolution of the structure. The perfor-
mance ecosystem highlights the relationships between
the physicality of the body, the instrument, and the
environment. Such a conception of music construc-
tion highlights music as an activity that can be
‘understood as [a] dynamical complex of interacting
situated embodied behaviours’ (Impett 2001: 1).
If however, we consider that the boundaries
between environment, listener and music have col-
lapsed, we can ask: what is it that the composer is
actually designing in this instance? The composer is
acting as a mediator between a physically embodied
complex system and a more philosophical notion
of an embodied interaction of the user. He or she
does this through carefully constructing the user’s
engagement within the situation. (For a detailed
account of philosophical embodiment see Dourish
2004: 126). The composer controls the experience of
the user, the environment of interaction: he or she
structures the moment of encounter.
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6. A NOTE ON AGENCY
In working with complexity we need to create many-
bodied systems in which agents interact. Also within
the concept of a performance ecosystem, a level of
agency is prescribed to all elements of the situation.
However, to what extent can simple mechanical
processes that make up installations be called agents?
Dennett, in his article Intentional Systems (Dennett
1971), describes an ‘intentional stance’ of prescribed
intentionality one can take towards systems in order
to help us better interpret or predict their actions. For
example, in trying to understand what a complex
being like a human would do next, it would be quite
natural to use folk psychology, or an assumption
based on our knowledge of their intention to predict
their behaviour. Dennett argues that such a stance
can also be applied to machines. He employs the
example of a chess-playing machine that is so com-
plicated that it has become impossible to predict its
outcome even by knowing every element of its pro-
gramming. In this scenario it is much easier to assume
the machine will make the best move it can within the
rules and goals of chess than it is to predict its move
from a knowledge of its constituent parts.
This notion of ascribed intentionality is interesting
from an artist’s point of view since it involves the
relationship between humans and technological sys-
tems. Nell Tenhaaf, in her article ‘Art Embodies
A-Life: The VIDA Competition’ (Tenhaaf 2008),
draws our attention to a pervasive tendency to attri-
bute agency to technological devices spontaneously
without consideration. This attribution of agency by
an observer is similar in character to an adoption
of Dennett’s intentional stance. Dennett himself
comments on the application of intentionality as a
‘convenient, explanatory, pragmatically necessary
action’ (Dennett 1971: 92). Dennett also draws to our
attention problems associated with the application of
intentionality to systems that may not strictly exhibit
intention. He states such problems can be easily over-
come since he does not state that his intentional sys-
tems ‘really have beliefs and desires’, just that we can
explain and understand them better ‘by ascribing
beliefs and desires to them’. It is this relationship with
systems that is of interest from an artistic point of view:
a construction of intentionality that is understood as
something that is applied by an observer and thus is
observer specific. Such a concept of a unique user-
specified intention highlights a developing relationship
with technology rather than just a controlling of it.
This in turn points towards a situation where there can
be a co-evolution of humans with technologies, where
‘[b]oth the humans and machines become actants who
have agency and inform each other, resulting in com-
posite societies of agents that include both natural and
artificial members’ (Tenhaaf 2008: 13).
7. A SHARING OF SOCIAL SPACE
In an ecological concept of music-making a level of
agency is present or attributed to environmental set-
ting, installation components and viewers alike. All
the elements can be considered as situated and
embodied, able to co-evolve with their environmental
context. Within this ecological concept of agency,
agents in music creation can be considered to be
coupled with their context, generating a shared
embodied meaning through all being part of the same
environmental space. As previously mentioned, these
ideas originally came to the fore when considering
Minimalist sculpture, so they are easiest to address
from the position of sonic practices that involve the
direct interaction of a listener embodied in a space:
for example, such listening scenarios as the concert-
going listener or, more obviously, the context of
interactive sound installation where the listener is
able to determine his or her physical relationship to
the piece through moving and engaging with it on his
or her own terms.
In the seventies and eighties, we lived in a society of
spectacle, in the nineties in the society of participants,
and we are now developing a ‘society of interactors’. (De
Oliveira, Oxley and Petry 2003: 106)
De Oliveira et al. draw a distinction between
spectacle, participants and interactors, citing Bour-
riaud’s notion of a relational aesthetics as a concep-
tion of art ‘in which objects are catalysts generating
communicative processes’ (De Oliveira et al. 2003:
106). The distinction they are trying to draw between
participation and interaction employs the term
interaction not as we commonly think of it, but as
‘social interstice’: a focusing on inter-human rela-
tions, sociability, art defined in the ‘realm of human
interactions and its social context, rather than the
assertion of an independent and private symbolic
space’ (Bourriaud 1998: 14). In such a conception of
art, communication is the key: as interactors are
becoming a part of the work, their presence is
required to give it meaning. As an example of his
ideas, Bourriaud introduces us to a work by Fe´lix
Gonza´lez-Torres Untitled (Arena) that was presented
at a one-man show at the Jennifer Flay Gallery in
1993. In this installation Gonza´lez-Torres installed a
quadrilateral bounded by switched-on light bulbs.
Portable music players were provided to the visitors
so that they could dance noiselessly under the fairy
lights. Bourriaud draws our attention to the notion
that the encounter with the work is more temporal in
nature, not eliciting so much a sense of space, as
experienced through encounters with Minimal Art,
but an encounter that is governed by time, ‘Time of
manipulation, understanding, decision-making, going
beyond the act of ‘‘rounding off’’ the work by look-
ing at it’ (Bourriaud 1998: 59).
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8. COMPLEXITY AS PROCESS
The installation Cross-Pollination (figure 1) is an
example of one of a series of works created by the
author to explore compositional methods driven by
an understanding of Complexity Theory. It aims to
guide the ear of the listener to the emergent musical
structures that arise from interactions between
the installation’s constituent parts. Its design and
construction are guided by a study of Complexity
Theory, and the author’s concerns with the listener
becoming aware of his or her perception of emergent
structures through interaction with the piece. This
piece aims to create a generative system where form is
not imposed from the top down, but is created by
interactions amongst the constituent parts. This sys-
tem is designed to be ecologically open in order to
add a level of indeterminacy to the work such that
form is not fixed within a boundary but rather is open
to the full complexities of the environment.
In order to create a ‘society’ of interacting agents
from which emergent structures can arise, this
installation is constructed out of twenty physically
distinct agents. Each agent is constructed from a one-
metre balloon, four metres of piano-wire, a piezo
transducer, a three-Volt motor and a motor con-
troller. Each balloon is connected to a piano wire and
on each balloon there is a piezo transducer. The piezo
transducers are each connected to a motor driver
in such a way that if there is any sound at their bal-
loon they will cause another motor to start spinning.
These motors are set up to pluck a different piano
wire, thus activating another balloon and hence
another motor. The piezo transducers and motors
are wired in two discrete feedback loops as shown
in figure 2, with the intention that a sound at one
balloon will start off a chain of feedback, ultimately
reaching back to the originating balloon. Although
the two feedback loops look discrete, balloons 1, 3, 5,
7 and 2, 4, 6, 8 on the diagram, since the balloons
have a double function of microphone and resonator,
and due to their proximity in a shared environment,
it is possible for the soundings of one balloon to
activate an adjacent balloon in a different feedback
loop. In this way it is possible that unforeseen com-
plex interactions can emerge, leading the installation
to take on an indeterminate nature of sonic output.
This cross-pollination of sound activation is further
disrupted and complicated since it is possible for the
balloons to be activated by any sound in the space.
Hence, users walking amongst the space or interacting
with the balloons, as they are encouraged to do, can
disrupt and/or augment the complex patterns they are
hearing.
This installation employs the strategies outlined in
the previous sections to negate some of the perceived
problems associated with working with complex
systems. It attempts to side-step issues associated
with the mapping algorithms from one domain to
another by using a model that is intrinsically sonic in
nature, attempting to create a scenario where the
interactive process is directly perceptible through
listening to and interacting with the piece. This is
facilitated through constructing the agents so that
they communicate with each other directly through
sound. The piano-wire/balloon agents both ‘listen’
and ‘speak’ in aural terms with a direct, physical,
acoustic connection to their environment and to each
Figure 1. Cross-Pollination setup in SARC’s Sonic Laboratory.
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other. These agents are designed to interact with each
other to form musical structures in time. These
interactions are governed by the acoustic energy of
one agent affecting the energy of another displaced
by space, such that if an agent hears another agent
making a sound it responds by making a noise. These
twenty agents thus respond to each other in the space,
listening and replying to each other’s acoustic energy.
These interactions are not hard-wired, rather they are
mediated by the space and thus the position of the
agents and distance from each other affects their
response. This distribution in space is designed to
facilitate the cross-talk of energy between feedback
loops (hence the name Cross-Pollination) and also to
create the sense of a completely engulfing environ-
ment within which users can bodily engage. Through
the employment of an interactive process in which
music and process are one and the same thing, this
installation presents a scenario in which listeners can
catch themselves in the moment of perception, lead-
ing the ear in the perception of emergent structures.
Since there are many agents listening from different
positions there is not a linear relationship between
making a noise at one point in the system and getting
a sonic result at another. On touching or activating
one balloon, you as an interactor have little idea of
what the result is going to be, not because the phy-
sical complexity of the installation makes it impos-
sible to predict, but because the interactivity of the
constituent parts makes it much more complex than it
seems. In Cage’s terminology this piece is open in
both a compositional and a performative sense. From
a compositional perspective there exists an environ-
ment, a situation governed by rules – rules which
define a field of possibilities. In addition to this
‘programmed’ indeterminacy, due to the interactions
between the agents, emergent structures appear that
are characterised by their novel and unexpected
behaviour. These behaviours emerge from the bottom
up, from the interactions between the agents and their
environment and are thus resistant to top-down
analysis. In fact, in two exhibitions of this piece the
Figure 2. Schematic of outlay of agents and interactions in Cross-Pollination.
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installation has fallen into unobvious patterns of
interaction seemingly caused by broken or disrupted
electronics. However, when constituent parts were
removed and tested they were found to be individually
working. It was only in situ, as part of a bigger com-
plex environment of interactions that they seemed to be
malfunctioning. They were instead exhibiting emergent
behaviours. Cross-Pollination is also open in a perfor-
mative sense. As it is an interactive installation there is
no prescribed way to interact with the work. Thus users
can disrupt and alter these forming emergent structures
through acoustic or physical interaction with the work,
becoming active participants in an ecology of music-
making (figure 3).
The piece is designed to reflect the non-reductionist
ethos of Complexity Theory. It is impossible get a full
understanding of the piece by considering any of the
separate parts in isolation. In this piece the environ-
ment is used as an active agent, a persistent entity
utilised to communicate between agents and inter-
actors and also to shape and affect the finished
sound. The installation’s sound is contingent on the
performance space in a very dynamic way and thus
placing the same installation in a different location
creates a very different result. This piece exploits the
indeterminancy of these environments and is ecolo-
gically open in that every element in the system is
affected by environmental variables: each element of
the system has a level of agency in the construction of
the piece. No part of the system has an overall con-
trol or a higher level of agency than any other. As
each system interacts through the shared medium of
sound there is parity between human and technological
interactors. Touching a balloon creates sound, which
in turn triggers a motor, which affects another bal-
loon, which creates sound in the space that affects
other balloons. Relationships between entities are not
fixed or hard-wired but are open to mediation by
location. There is a mutability of function of all the
elements in the situation. The agents act as receptors
and generators, microphones and speakers. They
offer instances of non-linear interaction and give non-
linear feedback. The environmental space acts as a
conveyor of information, a shaper of sound, and
is also an active part of the situation. The human
participants act as interactors and audience, perfor-
mers and listeners. There is an attribution of Dennet’s
notion of intentional agency to the constructs of the
system. The different balloon motor pairings seem to
take on intentional characteristics, being bullish or
shy, noisy or quiet.
The installation embodies the connectivity of an
ecology, where energy imparted in one area of the
installation affects components elsewhere. When the
space is populated with multiple human interactors
this displacement is taken further, with the colla-
borative effort of music-making now shared between
technological agents and humans. This piece thus
becomes a way of exploring sonic interaction between
a number of complex systems: the humans, the tech-
nological agents and their sonically active complex
environment. There is a sharing of acoustic energy, a
sociality of music-making between human and tech-
nology. Through a communication of musical ideas in
performance, music is created in the social interactions
within all the elements of the installation environment.
Figure 3. A participant interacting with the Cross-Pollination installation.
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9. CONCLUSION
This article has highlighted how an understanding of
Complexity Theory can be used to inform composi-
tional choices in creative practice. It has outlined a
conception of the notion of emergent structures that
is observer dependent and has related this to an
understanding of musical structures that sees them as
subjective and timely rather than as fixed objects for
empirical observation. This article has highlighted a
number of challenges of working with complexity-
inspired approaches to composition and has outlined
a number of strategies to overcome them. Problems
associated with designing a work to ensure emergent
qualities are perceivable to a listener were addressed
in two ways. Firstly, through an examination of
use processes in music it has become apparent that
there is a need for the employment of generative
structures that are in themselves inherently musical,
that concentrate on making emergent structures per-
ceptible to the ear. It is this simplicity of a relationship
between process and product that allows people to
catch themselves in the moment of perception, to
become aware that they are in the act of perceiving.
Such an approach also side-steps issues associated
with mapping from one process to another, therefore
avoiding the situation of a sonification of a non-
musical algorithm. Secondly, inspired by the non-
reductionist understanding of the world suggested by
Complexity Theory and a related concern for the
injection of some indeterminacy into the work, the
processes used are open in an ecological sense. Every
element in the situation of the installation – the agents,
the interactors, their shared environmental context –
has a level of agency in the construction of the struc-
ture of the work and the finished product. Such a
consideration of the creation of a work considers a
system not in isolation, but in a situation. It is a
context that recognises the specificity of listening that
is contingent on your surroundings. This prescribed
level of agency to every element in the system
acknowledges not only the active role that every ele-
ment takes in constructing the form and structure of
the music, but also the fact that every element is
involved in the creation of meaning.
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